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WHAT IS ORIGINALISM GOOD FOR?
John W. Compton*
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION (2013). Pp. 312. Hardcover $ 39.95.
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013). Pp. 240. Hardcover
$ 45.00.
MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
(2013). Pp. 292. Hardcover $ 29.00.
There was a time when the stakes of the debate between originalists and their critics
seemed relatively clear. In the wake of the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, early
originalists, including Robert Bork and Edwin Meese, argued that binding judges to the
mast of original meaning (or original intent) would ensure a more deferential judiciary.
Their opponents, who tended to be on the left of the political spectrum, viewed the judiciary as a force for social progress. The chief problem with originalism, from this perspective, was that it required the present generation to submit to the dead hand of the past, with
all of the tragic social consequences this entailed. Although these claims were contestable,
both sides seemed to agree on the tradeoffs their respective positions entailed. The Constitution could be understood as an impediment to judicial activism or as a tool for achieving social justice; it could not be both things at once.
To the casual observer, it may seem that the battle lines remain more or less where
they were in the 1980s. But two new studies – one by John O. McGinnis and Michael B.
Rappaport, the other by Frank B. Cross – make clear just how much the debate has changed
since the days when Bork and Meese were at the forefront of the originalist movement. 1
McGinnis and Rappaport are originalists who refuse to concede the force of the “dead
hand” argument.2 Originalism, they argue, does not impose insuperable barriers to constitutional change; properly understood, it is the only interpretive theory that empowers the
present generation to translate its values into fundamental law.3 Cross, a critic of originalism, launches a frontal assault on the idea that originalism exerts a constraining effect on

* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Chapman University.
1. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013);
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013).
2. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
3. Id. at 12-13.
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the judiciary.4 Indeed, he makes a strong case that originalism offers only the appearance
of constraint, while leaving judges relatively free to read their policy preferences and ideological biases into the text of the Constitution. 5
So where does this leave us? The final book reviewed in this essay, Mark Graber’s
A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism, provides an indispensable guide to the
reconfigured landscape of American constitutional theory.6 Although Graber does not
have a horse in the originalism race, he argues persuasively that the debate between
originalists and their critics has reached a point of diminishing returns.7 He urges constitutional theorists to move beyond the study of interpretative methods and judicial review
to consider other, arguably more fundamental sources of constitutional legitimacy, including social norms and “constitutional politics” – or the interplay of political institutions that
are set in motion by constitutional texts but which often evolve in directions not anticipated
by their designers.8 Americans have always disagreed about the best way of reading their
Constitution, he points out.9 The more urgent question is how such disagreement is processed by the larger constitutional order.
I.
At its core, the argument of McGinnis and Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good
Constitution consists of two interrelated claims. 10 The first is that supermajoritarian decision rules are the most reliable way of arriving at socially beneficial constitutional provisions.11 The second is that the benefits of supermajoritarian provisions will be lost if constitutional interpreters are permitted to depart from the “original meaning” of said
provisions.12 The first prong of the argument is developed in the book’s first three chapters,
where the authors explore various theoretical benefits of supermajoritarian decision
rules.13 They conclude that constitutions adopted under supermajoritarian rules are comparatively more likely to protect minority rights and to be viewed as legitimate by the
wider public.14 In addition, because supermajoritarian procedures make it difficult to alter
constitutional provisions once they are adopted – and because it is hard to predict how one
will be affected by a constitutional provision far into the future – such procedures tend to
discourage key actors from seeking short-term advantages at the expense of long-term social welfare.15 Supermajoritarian procedures, in short, offer the surest route to “a structure
of government that preserves democratic decision making [and] individual rights.” 16
But what does supermajoritarianism have to do with originalism? If we accept that
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

CROSS, supra note 1, at 1-23.
Id.
MARK GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2013).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 1-3.
Id. at 1-10.
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 11-13.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 1-33.
Id. at. 42-44.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 11.
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supermajoritarian procedures are the best way of arriving at beneficial constitutional provisions, McGinnis and Rappaport argue, we should demand that those tasked with interpreting our supermajoritarian Constitution respect the document’s “original meaning.”17
After all, a judge who deviates from original meaning is in effect substituting a new rule
for one originally adopted by a supermajority. And because the new rule was not adopted
through a supermajoritarian procedure, it is unlikely to be better – and may well be worse
– than the one it replaces.18 Even when a particular constitutional provision no longer promotes the common good, therefore, we would be unwise to trust judges with the task of
“updating” its meaning. Rather, the logical course of action in such cases is to formally
amend the text through one of the supermajoritarian procedures spelled out in Article V. 19
The authors acknowledge that the constitution-making process in the United States has not
always conformed to the theoretical ideal of supermajoritarianism.20 Still, they contend
that the U.S. Constitution was produced “in the main under appropriate supermajority
rules, and [that] the norms entrenched in the Constitution [therefore] tend to be desirable.”21
Having sketched a “welfare consequentialist” case for originalism, McGinnis and
Rappaport turn from theory to practice.22 How, exactly, should interpreters discover the
“original meaning” of constitutional provisions? Where most originalists focus on the
“original intent” or “original public understanding” of particular provisions, McGinnis and
Rappaport put forward a new approach, which they label “original methods originalism.” 23
The idea, in brief, is that constitutional provisions should be interpreted using the interpretive canons that were in widespread use at the time of their adoption.24 More controversially—and in contrast to prominent originalists including Keith Whittington, Randy Barnett, and Lawrence Solum—McGinnis and Rappaport reject the view that interpreters may
legitimately appeal to extra-textual considerations when confronted with vagueness, ambiguity, or constitutional silence. In other words, they deny the legitimacy of what has
come to be known as “constitutional construction.” 25 Indeed, they question whether it is
ever really the case that original meaning “runs out,” or fails to provide sufficient resources
for resolving vagueness or ambiguity. 26 Even when there are good arguments on both sides
of a constitutional question, they contend, the interpreter can usually resolve the issue by
weighing “the relevant originalist evidence . . . and select[ing] the interpretation that [is]
supported more strongly by that evidence.”27 The authors’ conception of original meaning

17. Id.
18. Id. at 85-88.
19. Id. at 88-94.
20. Id. at 11-13.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 14, 121.
24. Id. at 118, 129. They argue that evidence regarding Founding-era interpretive canons can be derived from
three sources: “rules that applied to all legal documents, rules that applied to state constitutions, and rules that
applied to statutes.” Id.
25. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (1999); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
(2004); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
26. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
27. Id. at 142.
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is further narrowed by their insistence that constitutional provisions are never to be understood as embodying “abstract principles that confer significant discretion on future decision makers.”28 Because constitutions are meant to constrain official authority, they argue,
it would make little sense for their framers to include principles so abstract that their future
applications cannot be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. 29
As we shall see, McGinnis and Rappaport’s unusually narrow conception of “original meaning” is not easily reconciled with their welfare-consequentialism.30 But first a
word on the book’s attributes. McGinnis and Rappaport have clearly thought deeply about
the central problems of constitutional interpretation, and they have produced an innovative
work that deserves to be taken seriously by constitutional theorists of all stripes. The argument that originalism must ultimately stand or fall based on its present-day consequences is both novel and provocative. Consequentialism, after all, has traditionally been
a key weapon in the arsenal of originalism’s critics (one thinks of FDR imploring the
Hughes Court to update a Constitution drafted in the “horse-and-buggy age” so as to meet
the economic needs of “present-day civilization,” or of Justice Brennan upbraiding
Reagan-era originalists for ignoring the social “consequences [that] flow from a justice’s
interpretation in a direct and immediate way”).31 In contrast, originalists have tended to
reject consequentialist reasoning in favor of appeals to abstract principles such as popular
sovereignty or the rule of law. But as McGinnis and Rappaport point out, there are serious
holes in the existing normative defenses of originalism. 32 The popular sovereignty argument is vulnerable to the charge that the original document was drafted and ratified by a
relatively small slice of the Founding-era public. Justifications based on the rule of law are
vulnerable to the rebuttal that it is possible to be bound by law – in the form of precedent,
for example – without being bound by the original meaning (however defined) of the text.
Even if these objections are far from fatal, McGinnis and Rappaport make a strong case
that they are sufficiently damaging as to necessitate a course correction. The most convincing justification for originalism, they argue, is not that it advances a particular, contestable principle, but that “it promotes constitutional interpretations that are likely to have
better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist theories.”33
But is this last statement true? Does strict adherence to “original meaning” yield
social consequences that are superior to those generated by non-originalist or pluralist approaches to constitutional interpretation? This is the point on which the argument hinges,
and here McGinnis and Rappaport are ultimately unpersuasive. The problem, in short, is
that the authors’ consequentialism, when combined with their unusually strict conception
of “original meaning,” leads to the untenable assertion that virtually every departure from
original meaning (as they define it) has left American society worse off than the alternative
of adhering to original meaning.34 Recall that the interpreter, in McGinnis and Rappaport’s
28. Id. at 84-85.
29. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 27-28 (2011) (providing a critique of this argument).
30. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
31. Transcript of May 31, 1935 Press Conference by President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, available at
http://newdeal.feri.org/court/fdr5_31_35.htm; JUDGES ON JUDGING 213 (David M. O’Brien ed., 3d ed. 2013)
(quoting Brennan, J.).
32. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 3-7.
33. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 118.
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account, has essentially two choices: she may remain faithful to the original meaning of
the text, or she may “update” the text in an effort to meet the needs of contemporary society.35 The problem with “judicial updating,” on this view, is that judges are ill suited to the
task of amending the nation’s fundamental law—or at least not as well suited as Article V
actors. But as even casual students of American constitutional development are aware,
history is replete with examples of judicial updating that seem to have left American society, on the whole, better off. If judicial updating was at least partly responsible for ending
or mitigating such evils as Jim Crow, child labor, gender discrimination, and anti-sodomy
laws, shouldn’t this count as evidence that judges are, in fact, perfectly capable of altering
constitutional meaning in ways that improve the wellbeing of the community? Is it not true
that, in each of these cases, strict fidelity to original meaning (narrowly defined) would
have produced more human suffering than the alternative?
Faced with apparently beneficial instances of judicial updating, McGinnis and Rappaport have essentially three options. First, they might deny that the “update” in question
was, in fact, beneficial to American society. Second, they might argue that all or some of
these instances have been wrongly characterized as departures from original meaning.
Third, they might argue that, although judicial updating has at times yielded beneficial
social consequences, pursuing the constitutional change in question through an Article V
amendment would have left society better off in the end. For obvious reasons, they mostly
stick to the last two arguments: We are told that apparent instances of “updating” in fact
marked a return to first principles, or else that the “update” in question could easily have
been obtained via Article V, thus avoiding various negative side effects of “judicial activism.”36 But these claims are for the most part simply asserted. Where one would expect to
find serious engagement with historical sources, McGinnis and Rappaport offer little more
than sporadic citations to the literature and dubious counterfactuals.
When discussing civil rights, for example, they concede that the Warren Court’s
landmark decisions, most of which were framed in nonoriginalist terms, helped to bring
the Jim Crow era to an end. And yet they contend that decisions such as Brown v. Board
of Education were necessary only because an earlier generation had departed from the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment – an amendment that “encapsulated” the
legacy of John Bingham and the Radical Republicans, and thus should have been understood to bar all forms of racial segregation, including segregated schools. 37 This characterization of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning is not without prominent defenders, to be sure. But the view that the Amendment was widely understood, at the time
of its adoption, to prohibit segregated schools remains a minority position in the scholarly
community, and McGinnis and Rappaport offer no new evidence to suggest that the prevailing view is mistaken.38

35. Id. at 81-90.
36. Id. at 93.
37. Id. at 111.
38. See e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to forbid segregated schooling); but
see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell,
81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to permit segregated schooling).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 22

432

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:427

As a fallback position, they claim that, even if educational segregation was not
among the forms of discrimination originally understood to be proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment, meaningful federal enforcement efforts on behalf of African American
political and economic rights would have rendered decisions such as Brown unnecessary.
Given a modicum of federal help, African Americans would have used their “greater economic and voting power” to press for integration; and Southern whites, in turn, would have
in time realized that the region’s racial caste system was “not . . . in their economic and
personal interest.”39 But here again, the authors’ counterfactual scenario finds little support
in the historical literature. As Michael Klarman has pointed out, segregated schooling was
universal in the postbellum South, even during the period of vigorous federal enforcement
of voting rights.40 Nor is there much reason to believe that market forces would have seriously dented the South’s racial caste system, absent the federal enforcement efforts that
followed in the wake of the Warren Court’s “updating” of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, as the economic historian Gavin Wright shows in his masterful new study of the
civil rights-era Southern economy, economic rationality was perfectly compatible with
racism, as most Southern whites were genuinely convinced that racial segregation worked
to their economic advantage. 41
When confronted with patently non-originalist decisions that seem to have benefited
American society, McGinnis and Rappaport consistently take the position that the constitutional change in question could have been achieved via Article V, if only shortsighted
judges and politicians had not short-circuited the amendment process. In the case of the
New Deal Court’s expansion of the federal commerce power – which, among other things,
facilitated the abolition of child labor – they argue that the Roosevelt Administration could
have won ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, and perhaps of a broader amendment expanding Congress’s commerce power, if only FDR had made the effort. Instead,
FDR, who was “unwilling to compromise” on the substance of potential amendments,
pressured the Supreme Court to rewrite the Commerce Clause, with the result that the
constitutional changes of the New Deal period were deprived of a firm foundation in the
text.42
A similar argument is used to dismiss the Burger Court’s landmark decisions on
gender discrimination. Although McGinnis and Rappaport concede that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit gender discrimination, they insist that
this problem, too, could easily have been remedied via a constitutional amendment. The
Equal Rights Amendment came within three states of ratification, after all, and McGinnis
and Rappaport argue that the Burger Court’s efforts on behalf of gender equality caused

39. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 109-11, 239 n.15.
40. Klarman, supra note 38, at 1891-92 (1995) (“[S]chool segregation was essentially universal in the postbellum period,” even in states where black voting majorities existed and where state constitutions “explicitly
barred the practice.”).
41. GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 65 (2013). As Wright explains, “[t]he vast majority of [early-twentieth-century] white southerners had a vision of economic progress in which blacks had no more than a subordinate role, if any.” Id. In
fairness to McGinnis and Rappaport, they may not have had access to Wright’s recently published study.
42. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 90-91.
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many state legislators to “conclude that a formal amendment was unnecessary.” 43 Moreover, they contend that the Court’s non-originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
lent credibility to the arguments of the ERA’s foes, who claimed that activist judges would
use the amendment to effect sweeping social change – for example, by mandating samesex bathrooms and forcing women into combat. 44 In sum, although the non-originalist decisions of the Hughes and Burger Courts were well intentioned, their most important consequences were negative: they sapped public enthusiasm for the Article V process and
deprived arguably necessary constitutional “updates” of the popular legitimacy that would
have accompanied a formal amendment. Theorists who justify “judicial updating” on the
grounds that Article V sets an impossible bar to ratification thus “have the matter backward.”45 “It is not that the constitutional amendment process operates poorly and therefore
nonoriginalism is required. Rather, it is that nonoriginalism prevents the constitutional
amendment process from operating effectively.” 46
The problem, as in their discussion of civil rights, is that the argument depends on a
series of complex counterfactuals for which McGinnis and Rappaport provide almost no
evidence. Could FDR have secured a constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s
narrow, pre-1937 understanding of the interstate commerce power? Despite McGinnis and
Rappaport’s claims to the contrary, scholars are divided on the question of whether “the
requisite supermajorities were in place” for an amendment expanding Congress’s commerce power.47 It is important to recall that the Child Labor Amendment had been languishing in the states since 1924, and aside from Arkansas, not a single Southern state had
ratified it. In light of the South’s monolithic opposition to this single-issue amendment, it
seems undeniable that a broader amendment expanding federal power over the economy
would have faced even greater obstacles.48 And the notion that the Burger Court singlehandedly killed the Equal Rights Amendment is similarly implausible. Even if decisions
such as Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson did, in fact, lower the stakes of the ERA
fight, it does not follow that the amendment would have been ratified in their absence. 49
For starters, it is important to note that opposition to the ERA was centered in the South
and a handful of religiously conservative Western states. Was it judicial “activism” that
drove legislators in these states to oppose the amendment? This seems unlikely. Prominent
opponents of the ERA, including Senator Sam Ervin and the activist Phillis Schlafly, were
stoking fears of same-sex bathrooms and women in combat even before the Court entered

43. Id. at 93.
44. Id.
45 Id. at 94.
46. Id.
47. See generally Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3-4 (2013);
JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 154-57 (2010); Gerald N.
Magliocca, Court-Packing and the Child Labor Amendment, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 476-77 (2011) (speculating that FDR may have hoped to benefit from the failure of the Child Labor Amendment, as this would
strengthen his hand in the Court-packing fight). Even if we accept this point, however, it also seems clear, based
on Roosevelt’s private correspondence, that FDR sincerely believed that securing a formal amendment was politically impossible due to Southern opposition.
48. Cushman, supra note 47, at 3. Cushman notes that Roosevelt abandoned the amendment idea only after
“[t]wo years of effort by Justice Department lawyers . . . failed to yield an [amendment] proposal[]” that seemed
likely to win ratification. Id.
49. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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the gender discrimination fray. 50 Jane Mansbridge, who in 1980 interviewed dozens of
state legislators on the subject of the ERA, reports that only a single lawmaker mentioned
the Supreme Court as influencing his or her position. 51 Would lawmakers in conservative
states have been under significantly greater pressure to ratify the ERA, absent the Burger
Court’s updating of the Equal Protection Clause? This assumes that voters in the Deep
South and conservative Western states viewed gender discrimination as a serious policy
problem requiring a federal response—and it is far from clear that this was the case. Indeed, at least in the South, opposition to the ERA was clearly rooted in resentment of the
federal government’s recent efforts on behalf of African American civil rights. With the
memory of forced racial integration still fresh in white Southern minds, there was, to put
it mildly, little enthusiasm for inviting federal intervention on behalf of gender equality. 52
As these examples suggest, Originalism and the Good Constitution suffers from the
authors’ reluctance to deal seriously with the sorts of tragic choices that a narrow conception of “original meaning” necessarily entails. Indeed, some inconvenient cases, such as
the Court’s landmark 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, are ignored altogether.53 Recall
that the Lawrence Court read the Fourteenth Amendment to bar states from criminalizing
sodomy between consenting adults—an interpretation that is almost certainly at odds with
McGinnis and Rappaport’s understanding of original meaning. Presumably, they would
condemn the decision on the grounds that it is better to live with injustice, and wait for
democratic decision makers to realize the error of their ways, than to risk the collapse of
our supermajoritarian constitutional order. But are the effects of “judicial updating” really
so severe as to outweigh the suffering of those Americans who were reduced to secondclass citizenship by the criminal statutes that Lawrence invalidated? What is the consequentialist-minded interpreter to do when confronted with entrenched injustice that is unlikely ever to be remedied by constitutional amendment? McGinnis and Rappaport offer
few clues as to how this sort of moral calculus might play out; indeed, they do not seem to
acknowledge that it is even necessary.
II.
If there is one point on which virtually all originalists agree, it is that originalism
constrains judicial behavior. Compared to rival interpretive approaches, that is, originalism
purportedly leaves little room for the interpreter to read his or her policy preferences or
ideological biases into the Constitution. For many well-known originalists, including Justice Scalia, this attribute alone effectively settles the interpretive debate in favor of original
meaning.54 But is there any empirical evidence of originalism’s constraining power?
Frank B. Cross sets out to answer this question in his new study, The Failed Promise

50. David E. Kyvig, Historical Misunderstandings and the Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, 18 THE
PUB. HISTORIAN 51 (1996).
51. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 47, 245 n.7 (1986).
52. Kyvig, supra note 50, at 53-54. Kyvig notes that Southern opponents of racial integration, including
Erwin, “raised the specter of mixed-gender public restrooms [as] a not-so-subtle reminder . . . of other recent
reforms, for which segregated public restrooms had been an important symbol.” Id. at 51.
53. See generally CROSS, supra note 1; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
54. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
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of Originalism.55 The first challenge that Cross—or anyone attempting a study of originalism’s effect on judicial behavior—must confront is that there is no universally accepted
way of “doing” originalism. Originalists differ among themselves, not only on the question
of why originalism is normatively superior to its rivals, but also on such critical questions
as whether the interpreter should be guided by “original intent” or “original public understanding” and whether non-originalist precedents should be given any weight in the interpretive process. Given the internecine divisions within the originalist camp, it is reasonable
to wonder whether it is even possible to specify something called “originalism” that can
be studied empirically.
Cross deals with the problem by defining originalism broadly: any constitutional
interpreter who “grants relatively greater importance to originalist materials and lesser importance to precedent” is considered an originalist for the purposes of his study. 56 This
raises the question of which historical sources should count as “originalist materials.” In
the end, Cross settles on a list of Founding-era sources consisting of The Federalist, Eliot’s
Debates, James Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention, early dictionaries, and
the Declaration of Independence.57 He does not claim that these sources do, in fact, reveal
the original meaning (however defined) of particular textual provisions. Indeed, he contends that these sources are both “incomplete in their coverage” and “of uncertain reliability, with records compromised by incompetence or purposeful bias.” 58 But originalists
must derive original meaning from somewhere, and Cross concludes, reasonably enough,
that extensive reliance on Founding-era sources should be regarded as evidence of
originalism in action.
Having arrived at a workable definition, Cross uses a dataset of Supreme Court opinions containing citations to Founding-era sources to quantify originalism’s impact (or lack
thereof) on the justices’ decisions. 59 He is not the first scholar to attempt this sort of analysis, and his quantitative chapters lack the methodological sophistication of some previous
efforts. Still, The Failed Promise of Originalism is more comprehensive than prior studies,
and Cross presents his findings with admirable clarity and candor.60 He is at his best when
using quantitative evidence to demolish popular myths concerning originalism’s origins.
Among other things, his analysis makes clear that originalism is a relative newcomer to
the Court.61 Although the Justices occasionally invoked Founding-era sources in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they did not begin to do so with regularity until relatively late in the last century. Moreover, he notes that the first signs of an ascendant
originalism can be detected in Court opinions from the 1950s and 1960s—a discovery that

55. See generally CROSS, supra note 1.
56. Id. at 43.
57. Other potential sources, including the records of the early Congresses and Joseph Story’s Commentaries,
are dismissed because they appeared too late to accurately reflect the original meaning of the text. Id. at 66-67.
58. Id. at 67.
59. See id. at 141-49; see also id. at 185.
60. For previous attempts to quantify the impact of originalist reasoning on judicial decision-making, see
Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002);
Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of
the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005); Matthew J. Festa, Dueling Federalists: Supreme Court Decisions with Multiple Opinions Citing The Federalist, 1986-2007, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75 (2007).
61. CROSS, supra note 1, at 73.
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calls into question the widespread belief that modern originalism was born in a reaction
against the Warren Court’s alleged disregard for original meaning.62 Finally, by examining
how often individual justices joined or authored opinions citing originalist materials, Cross
discredits the notion that originalism is a polarizing force on the modern Court. Since the
beginning of the Warren Court era, he finds no significant “difference among the justices
in [their use of] originalist sources.”63 Indeed, justices normally identified as foes of
originalism, including Justice Brennan, seem to have cited Founding-era sources at
roughly the same rate as self-proclaimed originalists, including Justices Scalia and
Thomas.64
Following this descriptive overview of the Court’s use of “originalist materials,”
Cross proceeds to test two specific hypotheses concerning originalism’s impact on decision making.65 First, he asks, “whether originalism is intrinsically conservative in ideological effect.”66 In other words, are opinions that rely on Founding-era sources more likely
to reach ideologically conservative results? Relying on Segal and Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme
Court database to measure opinion ideology, Cross finds little evidence to support this
hypothesis.67 Citations to Founding-era sources, it turns out, are about as common in ideologically liberal opinions as in conservative ones. 68 His second hypothesis weighs the
relative influence of originalism and ideology on judicial decision-making. More specifically, do “justices [who] rely on originalist sources . . . tend to reach results consistent with
their ideological preferences, or are they frequently driven away from such results?” 69
Here again, he finds no evidence that use of originalist sources has significantly impacted
the justices’ voting behavior. “The ideological results in justices’ opinions using originalism,” he concludes, “trace fairly closely the ideological results in opinions not using
originalism.”70 Justice Scalia, for example, reaches conservative decisions in 75.9% of the
cases in which he joins an opinion that cites originalist materials—a percentage that is
almost identical to his overall conservative voting rate of 75.7%.71 Justice Ginsburg, in
turn, reaches liberal decisions in about 69% of all cases, and in about 74% of cases in
which she joins an opinion citing Founding-era evidence.72
What should we make of the fact that reliance on Founding-era sources seems to
have little impact on the justices’ voting behavior? Does this mean that the justices are
deliberately manipulating the evidence in order to reach ideologically favorable outcomes?
Cross is agnostic on this point, but appears to lean toward the view that unconscious “motivated reasoning,” rather than conscious manipulation of sources, is responsible for the
lack of consensus in decisions employing originalist evidence.73 The larger point, however,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 176.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court database is available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php.
CROSS, supra note 1, at 177.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 187.
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Id. at 165-70.
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is “that originalism, at least as measured by use of originalist sources, has failed to constrain the justices . . . .”74 This is “not because justices ignore [the theory] but instead
because the originalist sources can be employed for either a liberal or a conservative result
in the closely contested cases before the Court.” 75
Originalists will no doubt find fault with certain aspects of Cross’s methodology,
including his expansive definition of originalism. The decision to label any opinion in
which a Founding-era source is cited an “originalist” opinion may obscure important differences between, say, the straightforward textualism of Hugo Black and the more historically grounded originalism of Justice Scalia. Others may attribute the lack of consensus
in originalist opinions to judicial incompetence, or else to a rudimentary grasp of originalist theory. As originalism becomes more sophisticated, and as justices become more familiar with the latest scholarship, perhaps we can expect a greater degree of convergence
in originalist opinions. Still others will point out that justices who employ originalist
modes of reasoning do not always do so sincerely. Perhaps the lack of consensus in
originalist opinions does not stem from any flaw in the theory itself, but rather from deliberate obfuscation on the part of justices who find the true “original meaning” of particular
provisions distasteful.
But despite its at times cursory treatment of potential objections, The Failed Promise
of Originalism largely succeeds in debunking the notion that originalism is comparatively
more effective than its rivals at limiting judicial discretion. 76 As Cross points out, even if
one grants the debatable proposition that divergent interpretations of originalist evidence
should be chalked up to judicial obfuscation—that is, to justices who refuse to accept what
they know to be the true original meaning of the Constitution—it is not clear how this
problem can be remedied.77 Consider District of Columbia v. Heller, the controversial
2008 decision in which a bare majority of the Court ruled that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to own a handgun, irrespective of involvement with a state
militia.78 The sharply conflicting interpretations of the Second Amendment’s “original
meaning” put forward in Scalia’s majority opinion and Stevens’ dissent cannot both be
correct. But both are coherently reasoned and well stocked with citations to Founding-era
sources. If one side or the other was manipulating the evidence—whether consciously or
unconsciously—it is not clear how this could be conclusively established. Who would arbitrate such a dispute? Cross does not rule out the possibility that “future hypothetical
justices [may] coalesce[] around one particular theory of originalism and . . . devote[]
[themselves] to it above all else, [thus] overcom[ing] their [innate] ideological biases.”79
But the impressive array of evidence marshaled in this study suggests that we would be
unwise to pin our hopes on such an unlikely development.
III.
Cross’s study raises a number of important questions about the larger enterprise of

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186-87.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
CROSS, supra note 1, at 194.
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constitutional theory. If originalism is incapable of constraining judicial behavior, is there
an alternative theory that can do better? And if not, what is the point of our incessant
theorizing about the true meaning of the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause?
Is constitutional theory little more than politics by other means?
These are big questions that Cross, understandably, does not attempt to answer. Fortunately, such big questions are the central concern of Mark Graber’s latest book, A New
Introduction to American Constitutionalism. Graber’s book is a sort of textbook, albeit an
unconventional one that “aim[s] to teach the teachers of American constitutionalism as
well as their pupils.”80 In particular, he hopes to broaden the study of constitutionalism to
cover more than “limits on government action enforced by the Supreme Court.” 81 Reducing the study of constitutionalism to the study of the U.S. Reports, he argues, leaves students without the analytical tools to understand vast swaths of the American constitutional
order. Armed with nothing more than a handful of memorable Supreme Court precedents,
he asks, how are students to make sense of constitutional questions, such as the debate
over the extent of the President’s war powers, which are unlikely ever to be considered—
let alone resolved—by the courts? Or, for that matter, how can students who have not been
trained to think systematically about the relationship between law and politics ever hope
to make sense of radical shifts in constitutional doctrine?
He has a point. Most teachers of constitutional law (the present writer included) do
a poor job of conveying the extent to which constitutional meaning is shaped by forces—
from social movements, to elections, to unwritten norms—that have little to do with case
law or jurisprudence in the traditional sense. And few casebooks or undergraduate textbooks even attempt to provide a systematic framework for thinking about the relationship
between constitutional doctrine and the various extra-judicial forces that drive constitutional development. Graber’s book goes a long way towards filing this void. He opens with
a discussion of constitutional purposes, proceeds through chapters on constitutional interpretation, constitutional authority, and constitutional change, and finally concludes with a
comparative examination of American constitutionalism. Along the way, he manages to
synthesize a vast amount of normative and empirical material, and he displays a rare talent
for simplifying complex arguments without sacrificing nuance. He also has a knack for
using historical episodes to illustrate the practical stakes of debates that might otherwise
strike students as hopelessly abstract.
Graber’s theoretical perspective, as he makes clear at the outset, is best described as
“historical-institutionalitst.”82 He describes constitutional meaning as emerging from complex interactions among judges, political actors, and ordinary citizens, all of whom operate
within a political universe structured by inherited norms and institutions. 83 If he is quick
to find fault with scholars who present an idealized portrait of an apolitical judiciary, he is
equally quick to insist that text, precedent, and other legal considerations set limits to what
political actors, and the judges they place on the bench, can hope to accomplish. It would
be naïve, he points out, to pretend that political ideology played no role in the Supreme

80.
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Court’s 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore.84 But it would be equally naïve to suggest that a
Republican legal challenge to the results of the 1996 presidential election could have
placed Bob Dole in the White House.85 “[P]ersonal values or interests” almost certainly
influence judicial decision making, he concludes, but only to the extent that they “can be
incorporated by legal means.”86
The chapter on constitutional interpretation is a particular highlight. Here, Graber
pulls off the remarkable feat of summarizing the major theoretical approaches in a style
that is both concise and accessible. The discussion is admirably evenhanded, and effectively highlights the strengths and weaknesses of originalist, aspirational, structural, pragmatic (or prudential) and doctrinal approaches. Although originalism is not singled out for
special criticism, one senses that more rigid forms of originalism are difficult to reconcile
with historical-institutionalism. Simply put, the notion that the true meaning of a constitutional provision is frozen at the time of ratification sits uneasily beside the historical-institutionalist’s awareness that constitutional principles have historically evolved in tandem
with underlying structures of political authority. For example, Graber rightly notes that
“judicial decisions, federal laws, presidential proclamations, and underlying political
movements” have effected far more constitutional change than Article V amendments over
the course of American history.87 He points out, moreover, that “whenever partisan coalitions have acquired relatively durable control over all national institutions”—as occurred
in the 1830s, the 1860s, and the 1930s—“their constitutional vision has become the law of
the land.”88 This is not to suggest that this type of “semiformal” constitutional change must
necessarily be viewed as legitimate. But Graber is no doubt correct to claim that such
change is hardwired in the structure of our constitutional order. Normative theorists who
ignore this basic fact of American constitutional development, he suggests, do so at their
peril.
Ultimately, however, Graber is less interested in pointing out flaws in particular interpretive theories than in critiquing the broader enterprise of constitutional theory. He
urges theorists to examine not only the ways in which constitutions constrain political actors through the mechanism of judicial review, but also the ways in which they construct
politics and constitute citizens. When a constitutional order flourishes, he points out, it is
typically not because judges or political actors have managed to constrain official power
by reasoning their way to a single, normatively best way of reading the constitutional text.
Rather, it is because the constitution has facilitated the internalization of broadly shared
norms and fostered a constitutional politics that “aggregate[es] existing interests, values,
and policy preferences in ways that privilege constitutionally desirable outcomes.”89 Conversely, when a constitutional order disintegrates, it is typically not because of interpretive
disagreement alone, but rather because the norms and political mechanisms that once facilitated peaceful dispute resolution have broken down – as in the slavery crisis of the
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1850s. Viewed from this perspective, it seems clear that the stakes of interpretive disagreement are somewhat lower than originalists (and their critics) want to claim. For all its
flaws, originalism is not the root cause of dysfunction in our constitutional order; but neither should we look to it—or any interpretive theory—for salvation.
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